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Affirmative action is the proactive process of using resources to ensure that people are not 
discriminated against based on their group membership, such as gender or ethnicity. It is an 
effective way to reduce discrimination, but attitudes toward affirmative action are often negative, 
especially in groups implementing affirmative action. Previous research identified different 
influences on attitudes toward affirmative action, but mainly unchangeable ones. We focus on 
the influence of abstract thinking on support for affirmative action because abstract thinking is a 
changeable characteristic that can direct attention to the purpose of affirmative action policies. 
Across five studies with U.S. MTurk workers—focusing on women as the target group, but 
including other target groups as well—we show that thinking abstractly improves attitudes 
toward affirmative action. We observe this effect using correlational (Study 1, n = 251) and 
experimental (Studies 2–5, ns = 201–515) designs. Additionally, we test whether perceived 
discrimination increases the impact of abstract thinking on attitudes toward affirmation action 
(Studies 2–5). We report a meta-analysis across our studies. Overall, thinking abstractly about 
affirmative action clearly leads to more favorable attitudes toward it, and this effect is somewhat 
stronger when discrimination is perceived to be high. Consequently, companies and 
policymakers that would like to increase support for affirmative action policies could use 
abstract thinking to do so, for example by encouraging employees to think about and discuss why 
(vs. how) affirmative action policies are implemented. 
Keywords: affirmative action, sex discrimination, abstraction, thinking, cognitive 
processes, construal level, quotas, gender  
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Abstract Thinking Increases Support for Affirmative Action 
 Imagine you are employed at a company. On the bulletin board, you see a colorful poster 
explaining a mentoring program for women. A flyer from the women’s career center advertises 
different workshops on presentations, networking, and career development. However, no such 
workshops are offered for male employees. Similarly, after a job talk, you overhear someone 
saying that a female applicant will be hired because she was as qualified as the male applicant. 
Understandably, someone in this position could feel that male employees are given fewer 
opportunities than female employees and thus feel that the company treats men unfairly. 
However, if the employee would look at these policies from a more abstract perspective—taking 
into account the abstract picture of why such policies are implemented in the first place – they 
might realize that these policies are used to counter continuing discrimination against women in 
the workplace.  
For example, women get less mentorship on average (Nolan, Buckner, Marzabadi, & 
Kuck, 2008), and are often considered less competent when they are equally qualified (Moss-
Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, & Handelsman, 2012; Sczesny, Spreemann, & Stahlberg, 
2006). From this perspective, the employee might feel more positive about the affirmative action 
policies in their company. In the present paper, we argue exactly this: That certain mindsets that 
people adopt when they think about affirmative action will critically determine whether they 
support such measures or not. In other words, if people take a step back from their own position 
and think more abstractly about affirmative action—thereby appreciating its general purpose 
beyond any particular case—they will have more positive attitudes toward it. 




Affirmative action can be defined as an action that “occurs whenever an organization 
devotes resources (including time and money) to making sure that people are not discriminated 
against on the basis of their gender or their ethnic group” (Crosby, Iyer, & Sincharoen, 2006, p. 
587). Often, it also includes attempts to reduce prior historical discrimination, for example, of 
women or minorities (Harrison, Kravitz, Mayer, Leslie, & Lev-Arey, 2006). Affirmative action 
can also be based on memberships in other groups, such as having a disability or coming from a 
low social class (Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Cancian, 1998; Kravitz & Platania, 1993). As a 
proactive process, it is geared toward averting discrimination instead of eliminating it after-the-
fact (Crosby et al., 2006).  
Although the fundamental goal of affirmative action is to prevent discrimination 
(Aberson, 2007; Crosby, 1994; Crosby et al., 2006), it covers a range of different policies that 
include both equality- and equity-based measures. With regard to equality, common measures 
are quotas and different types of preferential hiring. For example, the members of a target groups 
can be hired preferentially when they have equal qualifications or are above a minimum 
qualification level (Bobocel, Son Hing, Davey, Stanley, & Zanna, 1998; Harrison et al., 2006; 
Levi & Fried, 2008; Linton & Christiansen, 2006; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). With regard to 
equity, common measures are recruitment programs and additional opportunities for training. For 
example, companies can increase efforts to advertise jobs in places where target group members 
are likely to see them, provide additional training for the target group, or implement mentoring 
programs (Aberson, 2007; Jackson & Garcia, 2010; Levi & Fried, 2008; Linton & Christiansen, 
2006).  
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Affirmative action policies are often designed to be in place until equal representation or 
another set goal (e.g., 30% target group representation) is reached. Another possibility is that 
target group members are recruited and hired until the demographic make-up represents the 
make-up of the applicant pool (Harrison et al., 2006; Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). It is important 
to note that the implementation of affirmative action policies also depends on cross-national 
differences in legal regulations. For example, whereas quotas are not legally allowed in the 
United States (Crosby et al., 2006), they are legal and common in Europe (Jourová, 2016). 
Affirmative action is still badly needed, as women and minorities continue to be 
disadvantaged and underrepresented in the labor force. For example, in the United States, women 
run less than 5% of the 500 biggest companies, hold only 24% of STEM (science, technology, 
engineering, or math) jobs, and earn 21% less than men do when working full-time (DeNavas-
Walt & Proctor, 2015; Fortune Editors, 2017; Noonan, 2017). However, attitudes toward 
affirmative action are often negative. The reason for this is that affirmative action is often 
perceived as unfair because norms of procedural fairness are violated when decisions are based 
on group membership (e.g., gender or ethnicity) instead of merit- and achievement-based criteria 
(Crosby et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2006). For example, college students disagreed with 
affirmative action for various groups, and they found affirmative action to be unfair and 
ineffective (Murrell, Dietz-Uhler, Dovidio, Gaertner, & Drout, 1994). White management 
students, especially those higher in prejudice, perceived organizations with affirmative action as 
less attractive than those without (Walker, Feild, Giles, Bernerth, & Jones-Farmer, 2007).  
Additionally, attitudes might be especially negative for managers and other majority 
members who would be responsible for implementing such policies (Crosby et al., 2006; 
Harrison et al., 2006). This is problematic because previous research found that the biggest 
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contributors to the effectiveness of affirmative action are a committed higher administration and 
receptive key employees (Hitt & Keats, 1984). Similarly, lack of support by the president of an 
organization or resistance against affirmative action by employees impedes the effectiveness of 
affirmative action (Berry, 2004). Therefore, it is important to know what predicts attitudes 
toward affirmative action and how these attitudes can be changed. 
Attitudes Toward Affirmative Action 
 Research on attitudes toward affirmative action can be broadly grouped into two 
categories of influences: characteristics of the perceiver and features of the policy. With regard 
to characteristics of the perceiver, research has looked at the influence of more or less stable 
demographic features such as gender or race. Most of the following research is correlational due 
to this more or less stable nature. For example, studies found that women had more positive 
attitudes toward affirmative action than men had (Beaton & Tougas, 2001; Golden, Hinkle, & 
Crosby, 2001; Konrad & Hartmann, 2001; Konrad & Linnehan, 1995). Racial/ethnic minorities 
also usually had more positive attitudes toward affirmative action than Whites had, with African 
Americans having the most positive attitudes, whereas the attitudes of Hispanic Americans 
usually fell somewhere in between the attitudes of African Americans and White Americans 
(Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz & Platania, 1993; Levi & Fried, 2008; Parker, Baltes, & 
Christiansen, 1997). In line with this pattern, some researchers propose that attitudes toward 
affirmative action mirror self- or group-interests (Bobo, 1998; Bobo & Kluegel, 1993). 
 Research on perceiver characteristics also includes studying the broader category of 
people’s world views, such as political orientation, racism, sexism, or perceived discrimination. 
Several studies found that conservatism is related to opposition to affirmative action (Kravitz & 
Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Both racism and sexism 
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also lead to more negative reactions to affirmative action (Bobocel et al., 1998; Krings, Tschan, 
& Bettex, 2007; Little, Murry, & Wimbush, 1998; Tougas, Brown, Beaton, & Joly, 1995). For 
example, students who scored higher on racism measures were less supportive of affirmative 
action (Kravitz, 1995). With regard to sexism, the higher male managers scored on a measure of 
neosexism, the less they supported affirmative action (Tougas, Crosby, Joly, & Pelchat, 1995). 
Similarly, students with higher levels of modern sexism tended to more strongly oppose 
affirmative action (Son Hing et al., 2011).  
 Several findings also indicate that people who perceived that a group had been 
discriminated against had more positive attitudes toward affirmative action for this group 
(Aberson, 2007; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000). For example, employees who 
perceived women to be disadvantaged in their company were more supportive of preferential 
treatment of women in their company (Tougas & Beaton, 1993). If supervisors referred to prior 
discrimination to explain preferential treatment for women, people rated that treatment to be 
fairer (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996). Overall, such perceiver characteristics seem to have a reliable 
influence on attitudes toward affirmative action. However, most of them, such as perceivers’ 
own gender or prior discrimination against the target group, are rather stable, hence offering little 
possibility for attitude change. Nevertheless, these influences do not explain attitudes toward 
affirmative action completely, so other, more changeable influences are possible. 
 Consequently, other research has focused on the features of the affirmative action policy. 
This research is mostly experimental in nature. Affirmative action policies differ on how much 
weight they give to the target group’s membership in decisions. This plays a crucial role for 
attitudes toward these policies, with people opposing policies that do not take merit into account, 
and judging those policies to be less fair (Kravitz, 1995; Kravitz et al., 2000; Tougas, Crosby, et 
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al., 1995). For example, with regard to affirmative action policies for women, people had more 
positive attitudes toward policies that enhanced the opportunities of target groups, which take 
merit into account more. They had less positive attitudes toward policies treating target groups 
with equal qualifications preferentially, which take merit into account less (Krings et al., 2007). 
Similarly, for different human resources’ activities such as hiring, promotion, training, and 
layoffs, people reacted more positively to weak affirmative action policies (e.g., more outreach 
programs for the target group) than to moderate ones (e.g., preferential treatment when 
qualifications are equal), as well as more positively to moderate than to strong ones (e.g., quotas, 
Levi & Fried, 2008).  
In addition to supporting weak policies more, people also perceived the same policy more 
positively if they perceived affirmative action in general to be fairer, that is, when they perceived 
that these policies do not give women or minorities an unfair advantage (Kravitz & Klineberg, 
2000). Furthermore, if people were able to identify others (even hypothetically) who would be 
negatively affected by the affirmative action policy, they supported it less (Ritov & Zamir, 
2014). In contrast to the previously mentioned perceiver characteristics, the features of a policy 
seem changeable. However, changing them might be undesirable as it would mean that other, 
weaker measures than planned are taken. Therefore, it is important to look for characteristics that 
are changeable, but changeable in such a way that the effectiveness of the affirmative action 
policy is not compromised.  
Influence of Abstract Thinking 
 What may be other ways of influencing people’s attitudes toward affirmative action if 
perceivers’ characteristics and features of the policy itself seem impossible or undesirable to 
change? In the current research, we propose that turning to social-cognitive research in the 
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domain of mindsets—that is, how people cognitively construe certain issues—might offer a 
fruitful path. Specifically, adopting an abstract view when contemplating affirmative action 
policies might shape perceivers’ attitudes toward such policies. But, why should people who 
think abstractly about affirmative action be more likely to endorse such policies? 
 According to construal-level theory (CLT; Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010), increasing a 
person’s psychological distance from an object or issue (e.g., by taking a detached abstract 
perspective) involves thinking in abstract terms about said object or issue. Such abstract 
information processing, in turn, facilitates extracting the core aspects about an event or object 
(e.g. Smith & Trope, 2006) —that is, the deeper meaning or essence of a stimulus or issue at 
hand. Note that both a task, and the mindset when thinking about a task, can be either concrete or 
abstract. In the present paper, we refer to the mindset. For example, an identical action can be 
described and thought of in concrete terms (e.g., hitting the keys of a computer keyboard) or in 
abstract terms (e.g., writing a paper). This distinction corresponds to action-identification theory, 
which posits that actions can be described in terms of low-level identities (i.e., how the action is 
performed) and high-level identities (i.e., why or with what effect the action is performed; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In line with this view, perceivers may construe information about 
an affirmative action policy in more concrete terms (e.g., implementing a specific quota or other 
restrictions that will prevent some men from being promoted for a certain position) or in more 
abstract terms (e.g., increasing fairness by reducing discrimination against women in the job 
market).  
 In the present research, we argue that the latter kind of mindset (i.e., abstract thinking) 
can increase support for affirmative action. This prediction might seem counterintuitive because 
previous research has shown that high-level construal can lead to more self- and other-
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stereotyping (McCrea, Wieber, & Myers, 2012), whereas attending to concrete features of a 
person reduces stereotyping (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). However, consistent with theorizing, 
goal-directed activities such as an affirmative action policy, are represented by the desirability of 
the action’s end state (e.g., reduced discrimination) at a high-level construal (Liberman & Trope, 
1998; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Therefore, abstract thinking can direct perceivers’ 
attention to the underlying meaning of these policies (i.e., to reduce previous and continuing 
discrimination against women and racial/ethnic minorities). In contrast, a low-level construal 
leads to a focus on the feasibility of attaining a certain end state (e.g., implementing a specific 
quota as low-level construal, Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope et al., 2007). Thus, adopting a 
more concrete state of mind should entail a focus on details of affirmative action policies, such 
as individual actions that need to be implemented and that might have tangible consequences for 
individuals. This concrete mindset, in turn, might then distract from the deeper purpose of 
affirmative action policies by putting emphasis on the details that these policies entail. 
 Previous empirical research in the domain of abstract thinking is consistent with this idea. 
For instance, construing an action in abstract terms (i.e., high-level construal) can reduce the 
perceived boundaries between groups. Specifically, people who represent actions in terms of a 
high-level construal perceive greater similarity within and across groups, which in turn can 
increase important pro-social outcomes such as empathy and helping behavior (Levy, Freitas, & 
Salovey, 2002). Thinking in abstract terms has also been found to facilitate psychological 
processes that render it more likely that perceivers take action, presumably because they do not 
occupy themselves too much with the difficulties and details of a course of action, as opposed to 
perceivers who think in terms of low-level construals (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Semin, Higgins, 
de Montes, Estourget, & Valencia, 2005). Consistently, abstract thinking is associated with 
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elevated levels of subjective power (Smith, Wigboldus, & Dijksterhuis, 2008) and an internal 
locus of control (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989), which in turn are linked to optimism and action 
orientation (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).  
 In sum, those who think abstractly (vs. concretely) about an issue or an action extract its 
deeper meaning and are more prone to focus on desired end states (vs. preoccupying themselves 
with details and difficulties of its execution). Consequently, in the present research, we contend 
that such an abstract mindset can increase support of affirmative action policies because those 
adopting that mindset tend to focus on desirable end states.  
 Although there are numerous ways to experimentally manipulate abstract (vs. concrete) 
thinking via psychological distance (e.g., temporal or social distance), these manipulations might 
not be suited well for the present context. For example, previous research has used temporal 
distance to manipulate abstract thinking (e.g., Lammers, 2012). Participants who think about a 
temporally distant (vs. close) event or action tend to represent that event or action more 
abstractly (vs. concretely). Similarly, thinking about an event or action in the context of a 
socially distant (vs. close) target person or group increases abstract (vs. concrete) thinking (e.g., 
Liberman & Trope, 1998). However, in the context of investigating potential interventions to 
increase positive attitudes toward affirmative action policies, it does not seem feasible to 
manipulate when or to whom such policies would apply. Such manipulations would change the 
core of the policy, therefore posing a serious confound. 
 In an attempt to avoid these problems, we opted for a straightforward and commonly 
used task from the (mostly experimental) literature on construal-level theory to manipulate 
abstract (vs. concrete) thinking: the how vs. why task (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; 
Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & Sherman, 2007; Siddiqui, May, & Monga, 2014; Smith et al., 
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2008; Williams, Stein, & Galguera, 2014). This task relies on the idea that abstract thinking is 
associated with an attentional focus on desirability (why) over feasibility (how) of an action, and 
it can be well integrated into the presentation of affirmative action policies. Accordingly, having 
participants think about why (vs. how) an affirmative action is implemented should lead to more 
abstract, high-level thinking by directing the focus to the desirability (vs. feasibility) of that 
action. This task is well suited for the present context because it leaves the description and core 
content of the presented affirmative action policies unchanged and only varies whether 
participants think about why (vs. how) these are implemented, thereby offering a simple but 
elegant intervention. 
Hypotheses 
Our main hypothesis is that thinking abstractly (vs. concretely) about an affirmative 
action policy increases support for this policy. Additionally, we examine perceived 
discrimination as a potential moderator. Previous research already established that perceived 
discrimination leads to more support for affirmative action (Aberson, 2007; Bobocel & Farrell, 
1996; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000; Tougas & Beaton, 1993). Abstract 
thinking leads people to focus on the meaning of affirmative action policies, which is to reduce 
previous and continuing discrimination against underrepresented groups. Therefore, the effect of 
abstract thinking on support for affirmative action might be moderated by perceived 
discrimination: If people perceive that underrepresented groups such as women or African 
Americans are discriminated against, considering the abstract picture of the policy should lead 
them to realize that affirmative action is used to rectify this discrimination. In turn, this should 
lead to more positive attitudes. However, if people do not perceive these groups to be subjected 
to discrimination, such an abstract mindset might not lead to more positive attitudes for 
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affirmative action because people are less likely to perceive any discrimination that needs to be 
remedied. However, it is also possible that abstract thinking increases support for affirmative 
action, independent of inter-individual differences in perceived discrimination, by focusing on 
the positive end goal of a discrimination-free company, university, or society. A secondary 
hypothesis then is that the positive effect of thinking abstractly about an affirmative action policy 
on support for that policy is moderated by perceived discrimination. 
Current Research 
 In five studies, we test whether adopting an abstract view on affirmative action leads to 
more positive attitudes toward affirmative action due to its presumed focus on the desired end 
state. Study 1 provides first evidence for this prediction in a correlational design. Studies 2 
through 5 manipulate abstract thinking to establish the causal impact of abstract thinking on 
support for affirmative action. Study 2 examines whether thinking abstractly about affirmative 
action increases support for it. Study 3 replicates Study 2 and examines resource allocation. 
Studies 4 and 5 use different affirmative action policies and company descriptions to replicate 
the main effect of abstract thinking. Additionally, Studies 2 and 3 test whether perceived 
discrimination increases the effect of abstract thinking on affirmative action. Studies 4 and 5 then 
examine whether perceived discrimination in a specific company has the same effect. 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations, and all measures in the studies. All studies were run on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk). Participants on MTurk are more attentive to instructions than college students, 
and are more representative of the U.S. population than most convenience samples (Berinsky, 
Huber, & Lenz, 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Hauser & Schwarz, 2015). 
Furthermore, research with MTurk workers often leads to results similar to findings with 
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nationally representative samples (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2016). To ensure high 
data quality, only MTurk workers from the United States with an approval rate higher than 90% 
could participate, and only in one of the five studies. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we used a correlational design to establish evidence for our hypothesis that 
abstract thinking would be associated with more positive attitudes toward affirmative action. To 
do so, we focused on two common measures of abstract thinking. The first measured attention 
toward details of an object vs. the whole of an object and its relationships with the context. The 
second measured whether actions are identified at lower or higher levels of representation. We 
also used two measures of support toward affirmative action. The first examined support for 
affirmative action in general. The second more specifically tested support for workers hired 
through affirmative action so that we could test whether any predictive effects of abstract 
thinking would generalize from general support to support for specific workers. Data for all 
studies can be found at: osf.io/jk3cx. 
Method 
 Ethics statement. The present studies were approved (in their present or a similar form) 
and funded through a junior researcher grant awarded to Alexandra Fleischmann and Pascal 
Burgmer by the research unit FOR 2150 Relativity in Social Cognition of the German Research 
Foundation. The research reported here was conducted in accordance with ethical standards for 
the treatment of human participants at the University of Cologne and in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the German Psychological Society. 
Participants and design. We recruited 251 U.S. American MTurk workers (118 women, 
130 men, 3 other; Mage = 35.83, SDage = 11.32; 83% White American [n = 209], 5% [n = 12] 
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African American, 6% [n = 14] Asian American, 4% [n = 11] Hispanic American, 2% [n = 5] 
other) for a compensation of $0.35. Sample size was set a priori to 250 because correlations tend 
to stabilize around 250 participants (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013).  
Materials and procedure. Participants read that they would be asked about their opinion 
on several different topics and first completed the two scales measuring abstract thinking: the 
Locus of Attention (LOA) subscale of the Analysis-Holism-Scale (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007) and 
the Behavior Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The Analysis-Holism scale 
measures preferences for analytic versus holistic thinking. In particular, the LOA subscale 
measures the location of people’s attention. That is, it tests whether people focus on the whole or 
the parts of something in their lives. It includes six items such as “It is more important to pay 
attention to the whole context rather than the details” (Cronbach's α = .83) (Choi et al., 2007). 
Participants rated the LOA items on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree).  
The BIF measures whether people describe specific actions, such as cleaning the house or 
locking a door, on a higher, more abstract level or on a lower, more concrete level of 
representation. A higher-level description focuses on the reasons behind an action, thinking 
about its motives and larger meanings. In contrast to that, a lower-level description focuses on 
the implementation of the action, thinking about its details and means to execute it. The BIF 
includes 25 forced-choice items. Participants have to decide whether to describe an action in a 
lower or higher level of representation. For example, participants decide whether to describe the 
action “Making a list” either as “Getting organized” (higher level, 1 point) or as “Writing things 
down” (lower level, 0 points) (Cronbach's α = .91).  
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After that, participants rated the two scales measuring attitudes toward affirmative action: 
the Attitude Toward Affirmative Action Scale (ATAAS, Kravitz & Platania, 1993) and the 
Attitude Toward Affirmative Action Workers Scale (ATAAW, Susskind, Brymer, Kim, Lee, & 
Way, 2014). The ATAAS is a widely used scale that measures participants’ general approval 
toward affirmative action. It includes six items—for example, “Affirmative action is a good 
policy” (Cronbach’s α = .91) (Kravitz & Platania, 1993). The ATAAW measures a more specific 
approval, namely the approval of workers hired due to affirmative action programs. It includes 
five items—for example, “Workers hired through affirmative action programs tend to be less 
qualified than those hired without affirmative action” (Cronbach’s α = .90) (Susskind et al., 
2014). By using both scales, we could examine whether any predictive effect of abstract thinking 
on support for affirmative action would also generalize to support for workers hired through 
affirmative action. Participants rated both the ATAAS and the ATAAW on a 7-point scale from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). After that, to make sure that participants were 
familiar with the affirmative action concept, they indicated whether they knew what affirmative 
action was, with the answer possibilities “Yes,” “A little bit,” and “No” and then briefly 
described affirmative action. Finally, participants answered demographic questions.  
Results 
Most participants indicated that they knew (n = 182, 73%) or knew a little (n = 53, 21%) 
about what affirmative action was. We recoded reversed items for the LOA, the ATAAS, and the 
ATAAW, and calculated the mean, so that higher scores indicated higher locus of attention on 
the whole, higher approval of affirmative action, and higher approval of workers hired through 
affirmative action, respectively. For the BIF, we summed all items, so that values ranged 
ABSTRACT THINKING AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION   17 
 
 
between 0 (all answers on lower, concrete level) to 25 (all answers on higher, abstract level). For 
means and standard deviations, see Table 1. 
In line with our predictions, seeing the whole rather than the details (LOA) positively 
correlated with approval of affirmative action (ATAAS), however, not with approval of workers 
hired through affirmative action (ATAAW; see Table 1). Contrary to our predictions, describing 
actions on a more abstract level (BIF) did not correlate with approval of affirmative action in 
general (ATAAS) or approval toward workers hired through affirmative action in particular 
(ATAAW), but it also did not correlate with seeing the whole rather than the details (LOA) (see 
Table 1). When we repeated the analyses without participants who indicated that they did not 
know what affirmative action was, our results remained the same. 
Discussion 
 Study 1 provides first evidence that an abstract mindset, operationalized as holistic 
thinking, is related to more support for affirmative action. However, this did not extend to 
support for workers hired through affirmative action policies or to abstract thinking 
operationalized with the BIF. Although ATAAS and ATAAW measure similar constructs (as 
seen by their high correlation), it is possible that people refrain from generalizing their attitudes 
toward affirmative action to attitudes toward specific people hired through affirmative action. 
Therefore, other influences might play a bigger role here, explaining the lack of relationship 
between LOA and ATAAW. Note that we also cannot rule out small correlations for these 
variables, but our sample size gave us 80% power to find a correlation greater than .17. With 
regard to the BIF as another measure of abstract thinking, holistic thinking and the BIF also did 
not correlate, so the two scales seem to measure distinct features of abstract thinking: Whereas 
the LOA measures general tendencies to see the whole picture, the BIF measures specific 
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instances of abstract thinking that might not generalize to thinking about affirmative action. In 
Study 2, we therefore used an established task to directly manipulate abstract (vs. concrete) 
thinking about affirmative action. Furthermore, manipulating abstract thinking to establish 
causality is the first step in the direction of developing a theory-based intervention. 
Study 2 
 Study 1 examined whether general tendencies of abstract thinking are related to support 
for affirmative action and provided first correlational evidence for this relationship. Extending 
the results of Study 1, Study 2 tested the causal impact of abstract thinking on attitudes toward 
affirmative action more precisely. To do so, we experimentally manipulated abstract thinking 
with the commonly used how versus why task (e.g., Liberman et al., 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2014; 
Williams et al., 2014). This task is based on the idea that thinking about why (vs. how) an action 
is implemented results in more abstract, high-level thinking via an attentional shift to desirability 
(vs. feasibility) of that action. We used a strong affirmative action policy that includes the 
equality-based measure of preferential hiring because attitudes toward strong policies are 
especially negative (Aberson, 2007; Levi & Fried, 2008).  
Study 2 also included a potential moderator: perceived discrimination against the target 
group of the affirmative action policy. Perceived discrimination measures whether people 
believe that disparities in the workplace are based on previous discrimination—for example due 
to stereotypes or a biased selection process. Based on previous research (Aberson, 2007; Kravitz 
& Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000), we assumed that the effects of abstract thinking on 
attitudes toward affirmative action might be more pronounced for those who perceive higher 
discrimination in the first place. To test this, Study 2 assessed participants’ perceived 
discrimination against the target group. 




Participants and design. We recruited 201 U.S. American MTurk workers (87 women, 
113 men, 1 other; Mage = 36.29, SDage = 12.10; 80% [n = 161] White American, 4% [n = 8] 
African American, 6% [n = 11] Asian American, 7% [n = 14] Hispanic American, 4% [n = 7] 
other) for a compensation of $0.40. Using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), 
sample size was set a priori to 200 to obtain 80% power (Cohen, 1992) for a small-to-medium 
effect of Cohen’s d = .40 (~ the average effect size in social psychology, Richard, Bond, & 
Stokes-Zoota, 2003). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (thinking: 
abstract vs. concrete; between-subjects). In the abstract condition, participants had to think about 
an affirmative action policy abstractly, whereas in the concrete condition, participants had to 
think about an affirmative action policy concretely (more detailed description follows). 
Materials and procedure. Participants read that we were interested in how questions 
influence opinions on policies. Then, they read an affirmative action policy (the preferential 
treatment policy by Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). This policy included an equality-based measure, 
namely setting a minimum qualification and hiring target group members that met this minimum 
qualification until the demographic make-up of the company corresponded to the demographic 
make-up of the applicant pool. In particular, participants read:  
Corporation A’s affirmative action policy seeks to ensure that target-group 
members (e.g., women, visible minorities, and the physically challenged) are not 
underrepresented in the organization (relative to the demographic make-up of the 
applicant pool). When considering employees for hiring and promotion, a new 
procedure is used with Corporation A’s affirmative action policy. A minimum, yet 
adequate, qualification level for each position has been set. The most qualified 
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applicant above this level receives the available position unless there are any 
target-group members (e.g., women, visible minorities, and the physically 
challenged) above the minimum qualification level. In this case, the target-group 
applicant is selected before a potentially better qualified non-target group 
employee (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011, p. 348). 
To manipulate abstract versus concrete thinking about the affirmative action policy, we 
relied on the established how versus why task (e.g., Liberman et al., 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2014; 
Williams et al., 2014). Depending on condition, the heading stated: “How [Why] is Company’s 
A policy implemented?” Participants in the concrete condition were then asked to think about 
how the policy was implemented, whereas participants in the abstract condition were asked to 
think about why the policy was implemented. Participants in both conditions then briefly wrote 
down their thoughts. Although participants in both conditions thus thought about the affirmative 
action policy, they either adopted a concrete or an abstract state of mind while doing so. 
Next, participants answered the perceived discrimination scale (Linton & Christiansen, 
2006). The perceived discrimination scale measures how much discrimination people perceive in 
a hiring process and how much they believe that workplace disparities are a result of previous 
discrimination. People who score higher on the perceived discrimination scale believe that 
Whites have an advantage over African Americans in being hired due to stereotypes and biased 
selection systems. People who score lower on the perceived discrimination scale believe that the 
selection process is fair and African Americans are likely to be hired if they are qualified. The 
perceived discrimination scale includes 15 items—for example, “The current system 
discriminates against African Americans” or “If an African American is qualified for the job, 
chances are that he/she will be hired” (reverse coded). We also adapted the scale to measure 
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perceived discrimination against women by changing African American to women, Whites to 
men, and race to gender. Participants were instructed to answer these scales for the United States 
in general, and they rated both scales on a 7-point scale from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree 
completely) (Cronbach’s α = .92 for perceived discrimination against African Americans and 
Cronbach’s α = .93 for perceived discrimination against women).  
After that, participants indicated their approval for the affirmative action policy, by 
answering the following three questions: “To what extent do you agree with this program?,” “To 
what extent do you agree with the program's goal?,” and “To what extent do you agree with 
measures taken to achieve this goal?” (Tougas, Crosby, et al., 1995). Participants answered the 
questions on a 7-point scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) (Cronbach’s α = .92). Finally, 
participants filled out demographic questions and indicated whether they filled out the study 
carefully and their data should be used (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013).  
Results 
 All participants indicated we should use their data, so no participants were excluded. We 
first examined whether thinking abstractly about affirmative action lead to more support for 
affirmative action. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2a. Contrary to our main 
hypothesis, when participants thought abstractly about the affirmative action policy, their 
attitudes toward the policy were not different than when other participants thought concretely 
about it, t(199) = 0.29, p = .773, d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.24, 0.32].  
Next, we tested whether there was a moderation by perceived discrimination against 
women and African Americans, using Model 1 of the PROCESS macro v2.16 for SPSS (Hayes, 
2013) with 10.000 bootstrapped samples. In line with our secondary hypothesis, perceived 
discrimination against women moderated how thinking abstractly about affirmative action 
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influenced approval for it (see Table 3). Thinking abstractly about affirmative action led to more 
approval for it (compared to thinking concretely about affirmative action) only when participants 
perceived women to be highly discriminated against (one standard deviation above the mean for 
perceived discrimination; see Table 3). The pattern for perceived discrimination against African 
Americans was very similar: Thinking abstractly (vs. concretely) about affirmative action lead to 
more positive attitudes toward affirmative action when participants perceived African Americans 
to be highly discriminated against (more than one standard deviation above the mean for 
perceived discrimination; see Table 3).  
Because the affirmative action policy targeted women and minorities, we tested whether 
the results differed for men and women as well as for Whites and People of Color. A 2 (thinking: 
abstract vs. concrete) x 2 (gender: male vs. female) x 2 (ethnicity: Whites vs. People of Color) 
factorial ANOVA showed no main effect for condition, gender, or ethnicity (all Fs < 1.64, ps ≥ 
.202, ηp² < .01). Furthermore, neither of the three two-way interactions was significant (all Fs ≤ 
0.30, ps ≥ .583, ηp² < .01), and the three-way interaction was not significant as well, F(1, 192) = 
2.19, p = .141, ηp² = .01. 
Discussion 
Study 2 yielded mixed results: Overall, abstract thinking about affirmative action did not 
increase support for affirmative action policies. However, abstract thinking did improve attitudes 
toward affirmative action policies for people who perceived higher discrimination against the 
target groups of affirmative action (women or African Americans) in society. This speaks to the 
idea that abstract thinking might be able to increase a focus on the reasons for affirmative action, 
including prior and continuing discrimination, as well as the purpose of affirmative action in 
combating these disadvantages. Our data further suggest that this may be particularly true for 
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those who perceive higher levels of discrimination to start. If this was indeed the case, an 
intervention with abstract thinking might not add much because people who perceive higher 
discrimination already support affirmative action more. To examine the moderating role of 
perceived discrimination in more detail, we conducted Study 3. 
Study 3 
 Study 3 served several purposes. First, we examined whether the effect of abstract 
thinking extends to downstream consequences, namely the allocation of resources. We wanted to 
test whether abstract thinking would not only improve attitudes toward affirmative action, but 
also increase what people would (hypothetically) invest to establish affirmative action. Second, 
we replicated Study 2 to test whether individual differences in perceived discrimination would 
again emerge as a meaningful moderator of the effect of abstract thinking on support for 
affirmative action. Finally, the affirmative action policy in Study 2 referred to several target 
groups, therefore mixing attitudes about affirmative action policies for different groups. In Study 
3, we focused on only one target of affirmative action, namely women. 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 292 U.S. American MTurk workers (155 women, 
137 men; Mage = 35.92, SDage = 12.06; 77% [n = 226] White American, 9% [n = 26] African 
American, 6% [n = 17] Asian American, 6% [n = 17] Hispanic American, 2% [n = 6] other) for a 
compensation of $0.40. As we wanted to replicate Study 2 and wanted to ensure to detect a 
possible effect, sample size was set a priori to 290 to allow 90% power for the moderation of 
Study 2, using GPower (Faul et al., 2007). Again, participants were randomly assigned to either 
an abstract or concrete condition.  
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Materials and procedure. Participants again read that we wanted to know how 
questions influence policies. Then, they read about the affirmative action policy, which was the 
same policy as in Study 2 (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011) but narrowed to the target group of 
women. “Target-group members” was replaced with “women,” “target-group applicant” with 
“female applicant,” and “non-target group employee” with “male applicant,” and the description 
of the target group members in brackets was deleted. The manipulation of abstract thinking was 
again the how versus why task (Liberman et al., 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2014; Williams et al., 
2014). After filling out the task, participants completed the perceived discrimination scale 
adapted for discrimination against women in the United States (Linton & Christiansen, 2006) and 
the same measure for approval of affirmative action (Tougas, Crosby, et al., 1995) as in Study 2. 
Complementing our previous measures, we also assessed whether people would invest 
resources (time, money) for a non-governmental organization (NGO) that advocated for 
affirmative action goals (based on Baldwin & Lammers, 2016). Participants learned about two 
NGOs, People first and Together for everyone (see Figure 1, see also the online supplement for 
the original color version), that were randomly presented on the left or right side of the computer 
screen. Additionally, one NGO was randomly paired with an affirmative action goal (“Our 
mission is to achieve that the companies in this state have an affirmative action plan and actively 
avoid discrimination against women!”) and the other with a different worker-friendly plan (“Our 
mission is to achieve that the companies in this state offer flexible working hours and home 
office possibilities for their employees!”). People read that they had 100 hours of free time in the 
next month (time measure) and then that they had $100 to spend on something (money measure). 
They were told that they decided to volunteer their free time/spend their money on one of the 
two NGOs, but that they could also decide to have free time (time measure) or buy something 
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nice for themselves (money measure). Then, they had to allocate their time and money between 
the NGO with an affirmative action goal, the NGO with the flexible working hours-goal, and 
themselves. Finally, participants provided demographics and indicated whether we should 
discard their data due to inattention. 
Results 
Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2b. First, we looked at approval of affirmative 
action. In line with our main hypothesis, thinking abstractly about affirmative action increased 
participants’ approval of affirmative action compared to thinking concretely about it, t(290) = 
3.33, p = .001, d = 0.39, 95% CI [0.16, 0.62]. We also tested whether the manipulation varied by 
gender with a 2 (thinking: abstract vs. concrete) x 2 (gender: male vs. female) factorial ANOVA. 
Again, in line with our main hypothesis, thinking abstractly increased support for affirmative 
action, F(1, 288) = 10.89, p = .001, ηp² = .04, 90% CI [.01, .08]. (Note that we report 90% 
confidence intervals for F-tests based on the recommendation by Steiger, 2004). As expected by 
previous research, women agreed more with affirmative action than men did, F(1, 288) = 6.52, p 
= .011, ηp² = .02. 90% CI [<.01, .06]. Most importantly, the manipulation did not interact with 
gender, F(1, 288) = 0.90, p = .343, ηp² < .01, 90% CI [.00, .02], so that we can assume that the 
manipulation worked for men and women similarly. 
Then, we looked at downstream consequences, namely the allocation of time and money. 
The results were weaker than the effect on the measure of support for affirmative action. 
Thinking about affirmative action abstractly did not lead participants to volunteer significantly 
more time for the affirmative action NGO, t(290) = 1.89, p = .060, d = 0.22, 95% CI [-0.01, 
0.45], or donate more money to the affirmative action NGO, t(290) = 0.69, p = .489, d = 0.08, 
95% CI [-0.15, 0.31], than thinking about it concretely. To rule out that abstract thinking leads to 
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a general increased tendency of volunteering or donating, we repeated the analyses for time and 
money with time and money given to the other NGO as a covariate. Results were the same as 
without the covariate.  
Next, we tested whether the effect of abstract thinking was moderated by perceived 
discrimination against women with the PROCESS macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), Model 1 with 
10.000 bootstrapped samples. How much discrimination people perceived against women in the 
United States did not moderate the effect of abstract thinking on support for affirmative action 
(see Table 4). However, in line with our secondary hypothesis, perceived discrimination against 
women played a role in whether people who thought abstractly about affirmative action 
volunteered more time than people who thought concretely about it (see Table 4). When people 
perceived lower to average amounts of discrimination (one standard deviation below the mean 
and at the mean for perceived discrimination), they did not volunteer more time for the 
affirmative action NGO when thinking about affirmative action abstractly. Yet, when people 
perceived higher amounts of discrimination (one standard deviation above the mean for 
perceived discrimination), they did volunteer more time for the affirmative action NGO when 
thinking about it abstractly than concretely (see Table 4). Perceived discrimination did not 
moderate whether abstract thinking increased money donated to an affirmative action NGO (see 
Table 4). Again, we also analyzed the data with the resources for the other NGO as a covariate, 
yielding the same results as without the covariate. Six participants indicated to probably or 
definitely not use their data due to inattention. Results without these participants remained the 
same. 




In line with our main hypothesis, Study 3 found that thinking abstractly about affirmative 
action lead to more support for affirmative action. However, with regard to downstream 
consequences, the effects were weaker. Specifically, abstract thinking did not lead to 
significantly more intentions to volunteer time for the affirmative action NGO for all people, but 
only for those who perceived high levels of discrimination against women. Abstract thinking did 
not lead to a significant effect on intentions to allocate money. Furthermore, in contrast to Study 
2, we found that perceiving discrimination against women only moderated the effect of abstract 
thinking on time volunteered for the affirmative action NGO, but not on overall attitudes or 
money spent. To identify whether perceiving discrimination is a necessary prerequisite for 
abstract thinking to increase support for affirmative action, we manipulated perceived 
discrimination in Study 4. 
Study 4 
 The results of previous studies were inconsistent: In Study 3, we found a main effect of 
abstract thinking, but we did not find this effect in Study 2. Furthermore, we found that 
perceived discrimination moderated the effect of abstract thinking in Study 2, but in Study 3 we 
only found that perceived discrimination moderated the effect for time volunteered, but not for 
attitudes in general or for money spent. Furthermore, because we only measured perceived 
discrimination, we cannot rule out that participants who perceived higher discrimination differed 
on other characteristics as well. Therefore, in Study 4, we manipulated perceived discrimination 
to test whether abstract thinking would only increase support for affirmative action if perceived 
discrimination was high.  




 Participants and design. We recruited 201 U.S. American MTurk workers (89 women, 
112 men; Mage = 37.83, SDage = 12.91; 84% [n = 168] White American, 6% [n = 12] African 
American, 5% [n = 9] Asian American, 3% [n = 6] Hispanic American, 3% [n = 6] other) for a 
compensation of $0.50. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition of a 2 (thinking: 
abstract vs. concrete; between-subjects) x 2 (discrimination: no vs. yes, within-subjects) mixed 
design. We also varied which company (discrimination vs. no-discrimination) was presented first 
to account for order effects. Sample size was set a priori to 200 to obtain 80% power to find a 
small effect of f = .10 for the between-within interaction and to ensure that even small effects 
would have a high possibility to be detected. 
 Materials and procedure. Participants read that we were interested in how questions 
influence opinions on company programs and that they would get to know two companies that 
differed but had introduced the same program. Then, participants were randomly presented either 
with the company with or without discrimination first. To manipulate discrimination, we adapted 
the low and high prior discrimination company versions by Levi and Fried (2008). Participants 
read that women were underrepresented at each company (named Company X and Company Y). 
For the company without discrimination, participants read that the demographic make-up of the 
company’s labor market had changed and different factors unrelated to discrimination prevented 
the company’s demographic make-up from changing as fast. For the company with 
discrimination, participants read that the underrepresentation of women was the result of 
discriminatory practices.  
Then, as a manipulation check, participants indicated how much women were 
discriminated against in this company by answering the first four items of the perceived 
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discrimination against women scale (see Studies 2 and 3), all rated on a 7-point scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree). After this, they read the affirmative action policy 
introduced by the company. The policy was an adapted version of the strong affirmative action 
policy by Levi and Fried (2008), with an added part similar to the last sentence of the description 
of the prior discrimination by the companies. The policy again included an equality-based 
measure, namely a quota for women with a minimal qualification requirement. Changes from the 
original policy are given in brackets. In particular, participants read:  
In response to the low percentage of [female employees at Company X], […] top 
management [designed] an affirmative action recruitment program […] to 
increase the number of qualified [women] for its job openings. [In particular, 
preferences are given to women in the company’s affirmative action hiring 
program]. Specifically, [Company X] has set aside a certain number of jobs for 
women who are at least minimally qualified. (Levi & Fried, 2008, p. 1129).  
 Depending on condition, participants then thought about it concretely or abstractly 
(using the same how vs. why task as in Studies 2 and 3), and afterwards they rated their approval 
on the same measure as in Studies 2 and 3. After that, the procedure was repeated for the other 
company. In the end, participants answered demographics and indicated whether we should 
discard their data due to inattention. 
Results 
  Two participants indicated that we should probably not include their data because they 
did not fill out the study attentively. Results remain the same without these participants, and we 
present the results for the whole sample. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2c. To 
control for order effects, we analyzed all measures with a 2 (thinking: abstract vs. concrete; 
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between-subjects) × 2 (discrimination: no vs. yes; within-subjects) × 2 (presentation order: 
discrimination first vs. no-discrimination first; between-subjects) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
First, we examined the manipulation check: Participants perceived that women were 
discriminated against more in the company with discrimination than in the company with no 
discrimination, F(1, 197) = 819.59, p < .001, ηp² = .81, 90% CI [.77, .83]. No effects of abstract 
thinking or order of presentation on discrimination or any higher interactions were significant 
(all Fs < 1), making our manipulation of prior discrimination successful.  
 Next, we looked at approval of affirmative action. In line with our main hypothesis, we 
found an effect of thinking: Participants approved more of affirmative action if they thought 
about it abstractly than if they thought about it concretely, F(1, 197) = 6.09, p = .014, ηp² = .03, 
90% CI [.00, .08]. However, contrary to our secondary hypothesis and Study 2, and instead more 
in line with Study 3, there was no interaction of thinking with discrimination—that is, this was 
the case for both companies regardless of discrimination, F(1, 197) = 0.54, p = .465, ηp² < .01, 
90% CI [.00, .03]. Moreover, there was no effect of discrimination, that is, participants did not 
approve significantly more of affirmative action if the company discriminated against women, 
F(1, 197) = 3.82, p = .052, ηp² = .02, 90% CI [.00, .06]. To test whether abstract thinking 
influenced men and women similarly, we repeated the same ANOVA with gender as an 
additional factor, and we found no significant effect of participants’ gender, F(1, 193) = 1.37, p = 
.243, ηp² = .01, 90% CI [.00, .04], and, more importantly, no interaction of gender with 
abstract/concrete thinking, F(1, 193) = 0.01, p = .904, ηp² < .01, 90% CI [.00, <.01]. 
There was no effect of presentation order, F(1, 197) = 2.95, p = .087, ηp² = .02, 90% CI 
[.00, .05]. However, presentation order and abstract thinking interacted, F(1, 197) = 5.07, p = 
.025, ηp² = .03, 90% CI [.00, .07]. If participants read about the company with no discrimination 
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first, they approved more of affirmative action if thinking about it abstractly (M = 5.09, SD = 
1.48) than concretely (M = 4.02, SD = 1.80), F(1, 197) = 11.09, p = .001, ηp² = .05, 90% CI [.01, 
.11]. However, if participants read about the company with discrimination first, they generally 
approved of affirmative action, no matter whether they thought about it abstractly (M = 4.97, SD 
=1.52) or concretely (M = 4.92, SD = 1.60), F(1, 197) = 0.02, p = .878, ηp² < .01, 90% CI [.00, 
.01]. 
Discussion 
 Study 4 provides further evidence that thinking abstractly about affirmative action 
improves attitudes toward it. Interestingly, in contrast to prior research on perceived 
discrimination (Aberson, 2007; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; Kravitz et al., 2000), people did not 
approve significantly more of affirmative action when the company was described to have 
discriminated against women. Additionally, thinking abstractly about affirmative action lead to 
more positive attitudes regardless of whether the company was described as having discriminated 
against women or not. This contrasts Study 2, but is more in line with the main findings from 
Study 3. One reason for this might be that people read that women were underrepresented even 
in the company that did not discriminate against women, and might thus have perceived the 
affirmative action policy as an appropriate tool to increase women’s representation at that 
company, regardless of the specific reason of the underrepresentation (i.e., discrimination or 
other causes).  
Unfortunately, the effect of thinking abstractly also interacted with presentation order, so 
that thinking abstractly about affirmative action only improved attitudes when the company with 
no discrimination was presented first. When the company with discrimination was presented 
first, attitudes were generally already positive. This is in line with previous research on 
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discrimination (Aberson, 2007; Harrison et al., 2006; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). Providing 
clear evidence that discrimination exists and therefore affirmative action is needed might be a 
very efficient way to increase support for affirmative action. However, such clear evidence might 
be hard to accomplish, because it is inconsistent with actual real-world companies that are 
seldom found to explicitly discriminate against women. We address these issues in our final 
study.  
Study 5  
In Study 5, we replicated Study 4 with a different design, allowing us to address the 
issues we mentioned. To examine our main hypothesis, we again manipulated abstract versus 
concrete thinking. To examine our secondary hypothesis, we also manipulated perceived 
discrimination. To be able to do this more precisely, we changed two characteristics. First, we 
used a between-subject design to avoid influences of presentation order on the effect of abstract 
thinking and to ensure that effects hold when thinking about one specific company and 
affirmative action policy. Second, we altered our manipulation of discrimination to remove any 
perceived discrimination in the no-discrimination condition. Both companies were described to 
have 50% female applicants, and the company with no discrimination also had 50% female 
employees, making it clear that no discrimination occurred at the hiring stage. The company with 
discrimination, however, had 30% female employees, implying that hiring discrimination might 
have occurred. This manipulation mirrored real-world conditions as closely as possible because 
outcomes are often the only factor people can use to decide whether discrimination has occurred.  
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 515 U.S. American MTurk workers (228 women, 
281 men, 6 other; Mage = 35.89, SDage = 11.32; 74% [n = 383] White American, 8% [n = 43] 
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African American, 7% [n = 37] Asian American, 6% [n = 32] Hispanic American, 4% [n = 20] 
other), who participated for a compensation of $0.25. Participants were randomly assigned to one 
condition of a 2 (thinking: abstract vs. concrete) x 2 (discrimination: yes vs. no) between-
subjects design. Using GPower (Faul et al., 2007), sample size was set a priori to 512 to obtain 
80% power for the interaction (expecting a medium effect of f = .25 for the discrimination 
condition and no effect in the no-discrimination condition, Simonsohn, 2014).  
Materials and procedure. Participants again read that we were interested in how 
questions influenced policies. Then, they read one of two descriptions of Company A, which ran 
several hospitals and was quite popular with doctors due to good working conditions. In 
particular, participants in the no-discrimination condition read the following:  
Company A is a medium-sized organization that runs several hospitals across the 
state. It employs around six hundred doctors, and is well known for its good pay 
and benefits, and reasonable working hours, compared to other hospitals. Due to 
this good reputation, a lot of doctors usually apply to Company A if a position 
opens up. The applicant pool usually consists of around 50% female and 50% 
male doctors. A recent examination showed that from the doctors working at 
Company A, around 50% are female and around 50% are male. 
Participants in the discrimination condition read the same description, except that the last 
sentence was the following: “A recent examination showed that from the doctors working at 
Company A, around 30% are female and around 70% are male.” 
After reading about the company, participants also read about the affirmative action 
policy (an adapted version of the preferential treatment policy by Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011). 
This policy included an equality-based measure, namely hiring and promoting female doctors 
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that are above a minimum qualification to ensure that women are not underrepresented in the 
company relative to the application pool. Changes from the original policy are given in brackets. 
In particular, participants read:  
[Company A’s] affirmative action policy seeks to ensure that [women] are not 
underrepresented in the company (relative to the demographic make-up of the 
applicant pool). [If female doctors are underrepresented], a new procedure is used 
with [Company A’s] affirmative action policy [when considering doctors for 
hiring and promotion]. A minimum, yet adequate, qualification level for each 
position has been set. The most qualified applicant above this level receives the 
available position unless there are any [female applicants] above the minimum 
qualification level. In this case, the [female doctor] is selected before a potentially 
better qualified [male doctor]. (Zdaniuk & Bobocel, 2011, p. 348). 
Then, participants filled out the same manipulation of abstract (vs. concrete) thinking as 
in previous studies. As a manipulation check, participants indicated how much women were 
discriminated against in the company by answering the first four items of the perceived 
discrimination against women scale (see Study 2), all rated on a 7-point scale from 1 (completely 
disagree) to 7 (completely agree). Then, they rated the same measure of approval of affirmative 
action as in previous studies. Finally, participants gave their demographics and answered 
whether we should discard their data due to inattention. 
Results 
Seven participants indicated that we should probably or definitely not use their data due 
to inattention; however, results remained the same when excluding these participants. We present 
the result with the full sample. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2d. Participants in the 
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discrimination condition indicated that women were discriminated against more at the company 
than participants in the no-discrimination condition, t(513) = 22.89, p < .001, d = 2.02, 95% CI 
[1.80, 2.23], so we considered our manipulation successful.  
Supporting our main hypothesis, participants clearly approved more of affirmative action 
if they thought about it abstractly than concretely, F(1, 511) = 21.59, p < .001, ηp² = .04, 90% CI 
[.02, .07]. However, as in Study 4, abstract thinking did not interact with discrimination. 
Specifically, thinking abstractly enhanced support for affirmative action regardless of whether 
the company discriminated against women or not, F(1, 511) = 1.29, p = .257, ηp² < .01, 90% CI 
[.00, .01], contrary to our secondary hypothesis. In contrast to previous research, participants did 
not approve significantly more of affirmative action if the company discriminated against 
women, F(1, 511) = 3.84, p = .051, ηp² = .01, 90% CI [.00, .02]. To test whether abstract thinking 
influenced men and women similarly, we used participants’ gender as an additional factor, and 
we found that women approved more of affirmative action than men did, F(1, 501) = 11.26, p = 
.001, ηp² = .02, 90% CI [.01, .05]. More importantly, we found no significant interaction of 
gender with abstract/concrete thinking, F(1, 501) = 0.24, p = .622, ηp² < .01, 90% CI [.00, .01]. 
Discussion 
Again, in line with our hypothesis, we find that adopting an abstract view on affirmative 
action improves attitudes toward it. We also again do not find that people approve significantly 
more of affirmative action when a company is alleged to discriminate against certain groups, in 
contrast to prior research (Aberson, 2007; Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000; 
Kravitz et al., 2000; Tougas & Beaton, 1993). More importantly, even though the no-
discrimination condition described a company with equal representation of women and men, and 
the discrimination condition described a company with unequal representation (but made no 
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actual mention of discrimination), abstract thinking increased support for affirmative action in 
both cases.  
Meta-Analysis 
To better estimate the size of our effects, we conducted two internal meta-analyses with 
R (R Core Team, 2017). The detailed calculations can be found here: osf.io/jk3cx. The first 
meta-analysis estimated the effect of thinking abstractly on support for affirmative action. We 
included Studies 2 to 5 (averaging over the approval for the company with and without 
discrimination). We computed Cohen's d and standard errors with BootES (Kirby & Gerlanc, 
2013), and then computed a random-effects meta-analysis with metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010). In 
line with our main hypothesis, thinking abstractly about an affirmative action policy clearly lead 
to more support for it (Cohen's d = 0.29, SE = .10, p = .003, 95% CI [0.10, 0.48]).  
The second meta-analysis estimated how perceived discrimination moderated the effect 
of thinking abstractly on support for affirmative action. We converted the effect sizes of Study 2 
and Study 3 (moderation by perceived discrimination against women) to Cohen's d with the 
package esc (Luedecke, 2018) and converted the effect sizes of Study 4 and Study 5 (moderation 
by manipulated discrimination) to Cohen's d with the package compute.es (Del Re, 2013). Then, 
we conducted a random-effects meta-analysis with the package metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010). In 
line with our secondary hypothesis, perceived discrimination moderated the effect of abstract 
thinking on support for affirmative action, however, the effect was small (Cohen's d = 0.16, SE = 
.06, p = .007, 95% CI [0.04, 0.27]). 
General Discussion 
In five studies, we find that adopting an abstract view on affirmative action policies is 
related to more positive attitudes toward these policies. In Study 1, correlational evidence shows 
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that dispositional differences in holistic information processing (i.e., seeing the whole picture 
rather than its parts) predicts support for affirmative action (although individual differences in 
concrete versus abstract action representations did not emerge as predictor). Further, the relation 
between holistic thinking and support for affirmative action did not extend to support for workers 
hired through affirmative action. Studies 2 through 5 demonstrate that manipulating abstract 
thinking leads to more support for affirmative action. Study 2 indicates that only some people—
those generally perceiving high discrimination against underrepresented groups in society—
support affirmative action more after thinking abstractly about it. Study 3, however, finds a 
generally positive effect of abstract thinking across levels of perceived discrimination. 
Additionally, it suggests that abstract thinking might influence the allocation of time to support 
affirmative action policies for people who perceive high levels of discrimination against women. 
Finally, Studies 4 and 5 manipulate perceived discrimination, and they find that the positive 
effect of abstract thinking on support for affirmative action is independent of it. To better 
estimate the effect, we ran a meta-analysis on both the main effect of abstract (vs. concrete) 
thinking and the moderation by perceived discrimination. We found that thinking abstractly 
clearly increases support for affirmative action (main hypothesis) and that the moderation by 
perceived discrimination is also significant, but very small (secondary hypothesis). 
Our findings that adopting an abstract view of affirmative action increases support for 
affirmative action are consistent with construal level theory, which predicts that thinking 
abstractly leads people to focus on the meaning of an action (Smith & Trope, 2006) and on the 
desirability of the action’s end state (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Because affirmative action 
clearly entails a positive end state (i.e., to make sure that no discrimination occurs and to redress 
prior discrimination), focusing on its purpose creates more positive attitudes toward it. In 
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contrast to that, thinking concretely about affirmative action may shift the focus to the details and 
implementation of the policy, including potential negative side effects such as disadvantages for 
individual majority members. This focus, in turn, might induce more negative attitudes toward 
affirmative action because concrete identification of negatively affected individuals reduces 
support for affirmative action (Ritov & Zamir, 2014). This reasoning is also in line with research 
on diversity, which is considered desirable, but not very feasible. Therefore, diversity is 
preferred more under distant conditions (i.e., high-level construal)—for example, when creating 
a team for others—than under proximal conditions (i.e., low-level construal)—for example, 
when creating a team in which one participates (Jaffé, Rudert, & Greifeneder, 2018). 
Our findings are also in line with research on the distinction between idealistic versus 
pragmatic considerations (Danziger, Montal, & Barkan, 2012; Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). For 
example, Danziger et al. (2012) argue that in a dilemma where pragmatic considerations need to 
be weighted with idealistic considerations, people give more idealistic advice, but choose more 
pragmatically themselves because people construe dilemmas more abstractly and focus more on 
the “why” when they advise others than when they choose themselves. Similarly, Kivetz and 
Tyler (2007) state that distal time perspectives, which activate more abstract construal, lead 
people to focus on their idealistic self and their identity, whereas proximal perspectives lead 
people to consider pragmatic considerations and their instrumental benefits more. In a similar 
vein, affirmative action can be construed as a dilemma, where some people might have worse 
outcomes now in order to guarantee that future discrimination is reduced and ultimately 
eliminated. Therefore, abstract thinking can help to focus on idealistic considerations (i.e., to 
eliminate discrimination) and on the idealistic self (i.e., one that wants fair treatment for 
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everyone) instead of pragmatic considerations of implementation or even threats to one’s 
personal gains if belonging to the majority group. 
With regard to previous research on the positive influence of perceived discrimination on 
support for affirmative action (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Harrison et al., 2006; Tougas & Beaton, 
1993), our findings provide mixed evidence. The more people perceived that the target group 
was discriminated against in society in general (Studies 2 and 3), the more they concluded that 
affirmative action was desirable. However, when people perceived discrimination against the 
target group in a specific company (Studies 4 and 5), they did not approve significantly more of 
affirmative action. Normally, people vary on how much discrimination they perceive, but 
discrimination generally is perceived as unfair. Therefore, the more people perceive 
discrimination, the more they should want it to be addressed, and the more likely they are to find 
affirmative action fair (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996). In turn, perceiving affirmative action as fair 
predicts support for affirmative action (Kravitz & Klineberg, 2000). Future research should 
address the different influences of general perceptions of discrimination in society and specific 
perceptions of discrimination in a particular company. 
Interestingly, perceived discrimination was not necessary for abstract thinking to improve 
support for affirmative action in three of four studies. Although the meta-analysis showed it was 
significant as a moderator, the effect was very small (Cohen's d = 0.16). Therefore, the results on 
perceived discrimination should be interpreted with caution. It seems that thinking abstractly 
about affirmative action does not merely amplify the effects of perceived discrimination on 
support for affirmative action. Instead, people who think abstractly about affirmative action 
might focus more on the desirable end states and the purpose of affirmative action, hence 
showing greater support for it—above and beyond perceived discrimination. Consistent with this 
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observed main effect of abstract thinking, we did not observe any moderation of our findings by 
group membership (i.e., whether or not participants belonged to the minority or majority group). 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 We find that thinking abstractly (vs. concretely) about affirmative action increases 
support for it. However, the precise psychological underpinnings are not yet understood and 
remain an open question for future research. For example, how does abstract (vs. concrete) 
thinking about affirmative action change people’s mental representation of a particular 
affirmative action policy? Do people in an abstract mindset focus on the abstract (minority) 
group as a whole that suffers from continuing discrimination, whereas those in a concrete 
mindset focus on single individuals that may suffer from detrimental consequences due to the 
policy? In line with this speculation, previous research has found that being able to identify those 
adversely affected by affirmative action decreases support for affirmative action (Ritov & Zamir, 
2014). Or, does abstract thinking about affirmative action cognitively render salient the positive 
goals of affirmative action (i.e., to counter prior and current discrimination and avoid future 
discrimination; Crosby et al., 2006; Harrison et al., 2006) instead of the feasibility of 
implementing affirmative action (Liberman & Trope, 1998)? More research is needed to 
understand how precisely such mindsets and abstract perspectives affect the underlying 
psychological mechanisms responsible for attitude formation and attitude change regarding 
affirmative action policies.  
Similarly, future research might try to disentangle the effects of abstract thinking and 
psychological distance (e.g., Williams et al., 2014). Under some conditions, less (rather than 
more) psychological distance could increase people's support for affirmative action. For 
example, those who have been hired via such a policy themselves, or who are close to those who 
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were hired, might be more likely to support affirmative action in general, including for distant 
others. Even though we relied on randomization to experimental conditions and therefore did not 
consider such previous experiences that participants might have had, considering these 
experiences within a personal-is-political mindset (e.g., Peterson & Lamb, 2012) may be a 
fruitful avenue for extensions of the present work. 
In our research, we relied on the how/why task to induce thinking abstractly about 
affirmative action, a commonly used manipulation of construal level and abstract thinking 
(Liberman et al., 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2014; Williams et al., 2014). This task was successful in 
increasing support for affirmative action, but future research should employ other manipulations 
of abstract thinking to be able to generalize our findings. We chose to focus on the how vs. why 
task because, from the perspective of a theory-based intervention, other mindset-priming 
procedures can be rather artificial, whereas asking people to consider the “why” of such policies 
(e.g., on websites or from information brochures) seems a much more feasible way of increasing 
support for them. Additionally, Study 1 provides support for the predictive effect of an abstract 
mindset on support for affirmative action using a policy-independent and general measure of 
holistic thinking, thereby complementing the experimental findings that relied on the how/why 
task. 
One important question concerns the translation of our manipulation to an actual theory-
based intervention. For example, how long would effects from such an intervention last and how 
often would the intervention need to be re-administered? Although lab-based interventions often 
do not test this longevity (Paluck & Green, 2009), it would be interesting for future research to 
follow up with participants days or weeks later to identify the perseverance of the manipulation. 
Furthermore, it would also be important to test such an intervention with actual employees at a 
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company with an affirmative action policy. Our studies were run with MTurk workers who are 
older than typical college samples and who usually are employed in addition to the work they do 
on MTurk (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Huff & Tingley, 2015). Nevertheless, they might still differ 
from those employees who currently deal with an affirmative action policy. 
Practice Implications 
From an applied perspective, inducing abstract thinking could be an effective way to 
increase support for affirmative action in universities, companies or government institutions. In 
our studies, we relied on construal-level theory, a widely established psychological theory (Trope 
& Liberman, 2003, 2010). We also employed the established how versus why task (Freitas et al., 
2004; Liberman et al., 2007; Siddiqui et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2008; Williams et al., 2014), 
which is widely used and can easily be implemented. For example, when describing affirmative 
action policies, whether on company websites or in training manuals, the language should focus 
on the “why” behind the policies, explaining the bigger goals and the relevant background, such 
as previous discrimination, to gain more support for the policy. Similarly, in leadership trainings, 
employees could be asked to focus on the why of the policy and to state or write up reasons for 
the existence of the policy. By focusing on an established theory and a widely used 
manipulation, which at the same time can be easily implemented, we feel that our research is the 
first step toward a successful theory-based intervention. In general, the public debate about 
affirmative action policies seems to be mostly focused on the how (e.g., debates about whether or 
not quotas should be implemented), but policymakers should not forget about the why in order to 
sustain and increase people’s and decision-makers’ support of such policies.   




 Affirmative action is an effective policy that can redress prior discrimination and prevent 
future discrimination from happening. Unfortunately, attitudes toward affirmative action are 
often negative. These attitudes are influenced by characteristics of people and by their 
worldviews, which are hard or even impossible to change, and by features of affirmative action 
policies, which usually are not intended to be changed. Based on construal-level theory and the 
idea that thinking abstractly about affirmative action can enhance people’s focus on the desired 
end-state of such policies (i.e., to eliminate discrimination), the present research introduces 
social-cognitive processes as a more flexible tool to increase support for affirmative action. 
Merely considering the abstract picture of affirmative action can increase support for it, thereby 
providing an efficient way of combating future discrimination. 
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Study Variables, Study 1 
   Correlations 
Variable M (SD) 95% CI 2 3 4 
1. Locus of Attention Subscale 4.90 (1.08) [4.77, 5.03] .063 .138* .088 
2. Behavior Identification Form 14.48 (6.81) [13.65, 15.33] -- .072 .080 
3. Attitude Toward Affirmative Action 4.68 (1.52) [4.49, 4.86]  -- .819*** 
4. Attitude toward Affirmative Action Workers 4.87 (1.58) [4.67, 5.06]   -- 
*p < .05. ***p < .001. 





Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables within Experimental Conditions, Studies 2–5 
 Abstract Thinking Condition  Concrete Thinking Condition 
Variable M SD 95% CI  M SD 95% CI 
(a) Study 2 
 Approval 4.06 2.06 [3.65, 4.44]  4.14 1.83 [3.78, 4.49] 
 PD of AA 3.94 1.40 [3.67, 4.21]  4.03 1.38 [3.75, 4.30] 
 PD of women 4.04 1.39 [3.77, 4.30]  4.24 1.37 [3.98, 4.51] 
(b) Study 3 
 Approval 4.11 1.83 [3.81, 4.40]  3.39 1.86 [3.09, 3.69] 
 PD of women 4.32 1.30 [4.11, 4.53]  4.11 1.34 [3.88, 4.32] 
 Time 19.19 20.80 [16.01, 22.59]  14.77 19.05 [11.79, 17.94] 
 Money 15.95 17.52 [13.20, 18.80]  14.37 21.13 [11.07, 18.00] 
(c) Study 4 
 Approval HD 5.18 1.71 [4.85, 5.51]  4.55 1.89 [4.17, 4.91] 
 Approval LD 4.87 1.75 [4.53, 5.21]  4.41 1.92 [4.04, 4.78] 
(d) Study 5 
 Approval HD 4.43 1.76 [4.10, 4.73]  3.49 1.71 [3.19, 3.79] 
 Approval LD 3.92 2.07 [3.58, 4.28]  3.36 1.78 [3.06, 3.67] 
Note. Approval = Approval of the affirmative action policy; PD of AA = perceived discrimination against 
African Americans; PD of women = perceived discrimination against women; Time = Time volunteered 
for affirmative action NGO; Money = Money volunteered for affirmative action NGO; Approval HD = 
Approval of the affirmative action policy in the high discrimination company; Approval LD = Approval 
of the affirmative action policy in the low discrimination company.  




Conditional Effects of Abstract (vs. Concrete) Thinking on Support for Affirmative Action, 
Study 2 
Perceived discrimination against b SE p 95% CI 
Womena,b 0.40 0.16 .015 [0.08, 0.72] 
2.76 (-1 SD) -0.47 0.32 .141 [-1.09, 0.16] 
4.14 (mean) 0.08 0.22 .714 [-0.36, 0.52] 
5.53 (+1 SD) 0.63 0.32 .047 [0.01, 1.26] 
African Americansc,d 0.39  0.16 .016 [0.07, 0.71] 
2.60 (-1 SD) -0.55 0.32 .083 [-1.17, 0.07] 
3.98 (mean) -0.01 0.22 .971 [-0.45, 0.43] 
5.37 (+1 SD) 0.53 0.32 .091 [-0.09, 1.16] 
Note. For perceived discrimination against women: n = 31 for ≤ 2.76, n = 72 for > 2.76 and ≤ 4.14, n = 
59 for > 4.14 and ≤ 5.53, and n = 39 for > 5.53. For perceived discrimination against African 
Americans, n = 34 for ≤ 2.60, n = 63 for > 2.60 and ≤ 3.98, n = 67 for > 3.98 and ≤ 5.37, and n = 37 for 
> 5.37. 
aNote that the values for women refer to the moderation of the effect of abstract thinking on support for 
affirmative action by perceived discrimination against women. bJohnson-Neyman significance regions 
show that thinking abstractly is negatively related to support for affirmative action when perceived 
discrimination against women is lower than 1.64 and a positively related when perceived discrimination 
is higher than 5.47. cNote that the values for African Americans refer to the moderation of the effect of 
abstract thinking on support for affirmative action by perceived discrimination against African 
Americans. dJohnson-Neyman significance regions show that thinking abstractly is negatively related to 
support for affirmative action when perceived discrimination against African Americans is lower than 
2.12 and positively related when perceived discrimination is higher than 5.95.  
 
  




Conditional Effects of Abstract (vs. Concrete) Thinking on Support for Affirmative Action by 
Perceived Discrimination against Women in Study 3 
Perceived discrimination against women b SE p 95% CI 
Attitudes toward affirmative actiona,b 0.17 0.12 .176 [-0.07, 0.40] 
2.89 (-1 SD) 0.30 0.23 .188 [-0.15, 0.75] 
4.21 (mean) 0.52 0.16 .001 [0.20, 0.84] 
5.54 (+1 SD) 0.74 0.23 .001 [0.29, 1.19] 
Time for affirmative actiona,c 3.43 1.69 .044 [0.10, 6.76] 
2.89 (-1 SD) -1.05 3.17 .742 [-7.29, 5.20] 
4.21 (mean) 3.50 2.24 .119 [-0.91, 7.91] 
5.54 (+1 SD) 8.05 3.17 .012 [1.82, 14.29] 
Money for affirmative actiona 1.64 1.67 .326 [-1.64, 4.93] 
2.89 (- one SD) -1.40 3.13 .656 [-7.56, 4.76] 
4.21 (mean) 0.78 2.21 .724 [-3.57, 5.13] 
5.54 (+ one SD) 2.96 3.12 .345 [-3.19, 9.11] 
Note. n = 55 for ≤ 2.89, n = 91 for > 2.69 and ≤ 4.21, n = 94 for > 4.21 and ≤ 5.54, and n = 52 for > 
5.54. 
aNote that the values for attitudes toward affirmative action, time for affirmative action, and money for 
affirmative action refer to the moderation of the effect of abstract thinking on these variables by 
perceived discrimination against women. bJohnson-Neyman significance regions show that thinking 
abstractly is positively related to support for affirmative action when perceived discrimination against 
women is higher than 3.35. cJohnson-Neyman significance regions show that thinking abstractly is 
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Figure 1. The two hypothetical NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) used in Study 3. 
NGOs were randomly presented on the left or right side of the screen and randomly combined 
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Figure 1s. Color version of the two hypothetical NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) used 
in Study 3. NGOs were randomly presented on the left or right side of the screen and randomly 
combined with an affirmative action or a flexible-working-hours goal. 
 
